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Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,
Defendant:
The Case for a Unified Federal
Copyright System for Sound
Recordings
Brian G. Shaffer*
I. Introduction: A (Hazy) Dual System of Copyright
Protection
February 15, 1972 is a landmark date in the history of
copyright protection for sound recordings in the United States.
In response to a growing movement toward criminalizing music
“piracy,” Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909 to include
“sound recordings” under the wing of federal protection.1
Congress, however, extended copyright protection to sound
recordings only prospectively; thus, all recordings created before
February 15, 1972, the effective date of the 1971 amendments,
were left outside the scope of the Copyright Act.2 Pre-1972
sound recordings have consequently been protected by a variety
of property protections at the state level, creating a legal
standard that “is inconsistent from state to state, often vague,
and sometimes difficult to discern.”3
The inconsistency in copyright protection may serve as an
J.D. Candidate, 2016, Pace University School of Law.
1. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 260 (N.Y.
2005). The Naxos case is considered the “most notable case in recent years
involving pre-1972 sound recordings.” Michael I. Rudell & Neil J. Rosini, Pre1972 Sound Recordings-A Legal Breed Apart, 250-82 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 25, 2013,
at 3 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
PRE-1972
SOUND
RECORDINGS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf).
2. Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 260.
3. Rudell & Rosini, supra note 1.
*
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incentive for radio services to maximize profits by reducing or
eliminating royalty payments related to pre-1972 recordings.
Sirius XM, which serves some 25 million subscribers, is
currently the only satellite radio provider in the United States.4
In 2012, “the company had $3.4 billion in revenue and paid 8
percent of its gross revenue in royalties to record companies and
performers, according to its annual report.”5 Over a period of
five weeks, different plaintiffs filed three separate lawsuits
naming Sirius XM as defendant, alleging improper use of sound
recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.6 Two of the lawsuits
were filed in California,7 a state with a long history of protecting
artists’ property rights to pre-1972 sound recordings.8 A third
lawsuit, however, filed in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, set out causes of action based in federal
laws and regulations regarding copyrights and payment of
royalties.9
This article observes the surviving gap between state and
federal protection of music recordings through the lens of the
current litigation against Sirius XM. Part II sets out a history
of copyright protection in the music industry. Part III outlines
the relevant provisions of the federal Copyright Act and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the role played in the
federal system by the Copyright Royalty Board. Part IV
examines the pertinent statutory property protection of music
recordings in the state of California. Part V then discusses the
merits of the current lawsuits against Sirius XM. After
4. Ben Sisario, Record Labels Sue Sirius XM Over the Use of Older Music,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at B4.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC520981 (Cal.
Super. filed Sept. 11, 2013); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No.
2:13CV05693 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 2013). Plaintiffs in the latter case have
applied for class action status, see Sisario, supra note 4, and their claims are
addressed in this paper only insofar as they may impact the treatment of the
plaintiffs’ claims in the Capitol Records case.
8. See Complaint ¶ 1, Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No.
BC520981 (Cal. Super. filed Sept. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Capital Records v.
Sirius XM Complaint] (“For over 40 years, sound recordings have been
protected by California common law, and for over 30 years they have been
provided protection under Section 980 of the California Civil Code.”).
9. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 26, 2013).
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considering the potential legal and economic ramifications of the
current lawsuits, Part VI then concludes by advocating for a
unified federal system of copyright protection for all sound
recordings regardless of the date on which they were originally
fixed.
II. A History of Copyright Protection in the Music Industry
Prior to the 20th century, when the music recording
industry began to take a commercial foothold, the seminal
copyright law case in the United States was Wheaton v. Peters,
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), in which the plaintiff, an official
reporter for the U.S. Supreme Court, sought “to prevent his
successor from copying and republishing material contained in
the volumes published by the first three official reporters.”10 In
a thorough discussion of the history of American copyright law,
the Court of Appeals of New York noted that “[t]he lasting effect
of the Wheaton decision was that it ‘became accepted, and in
most cases unquestioned, doctrine that . . . it was the act of
publication which divested common law rights.’”11
Since
copyright statutes were “created with sole reference to the
written word,” however, the issue of how to apply such statutes
to music was left unresolved until the early 1900’s.12
The United States Supreme Court first passed upon the
issue of the federal Copyright Act’s application to forms of
communication other than the written word in 1908.13
“Although acknowledging that the federal statute had been
amended as far back as 1831 to include ‘musical composition[s],’
the Court believed that only written works that could be ‘see[n]
and read’ met the requirement for filing with the Library of
Congress—a prerequisite to securing federal copyright
protection.”14 Congress at this time had begun to revise the
10. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 257 (N.Y.
2005) (citation omitted); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
A great deal of thanks is owed to the Court of Appeals of New York, whose
outline of the history of American copyright law in the Naxos case is both
extensive and informative.
11. Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 257-58 (citation omitted).
12. Id. at 258.
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1,
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copyright statutes “but decided to wait for the Supreme Court’s
decision.”15 Once this decision was handed down, Congress
passed the Copyright Act of 1909, which reflected the Supreme
Court’s ruling in White-Smith by excluding audio recordings,
which could not be “published,” from federal copyright
protection.16 In section 2 of the 1909 Act, however, “Congress
explicitly stated that the Act ‘shall [not] be construed to annul
or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished
work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying,
publication, or use of such unpublished work without his
consent, and to obtain damages therefor,’” thus preserving
states’ power to offer common-law copyright protection to
unpublished sound recordings.17
Following Congress’ affirmation of this “dual system of
copyright protection[,]” the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
ruled that phonograph recordings of an orchestra’s
performances were entitled to state common-law protection,
stating “that a performer who transforms a musical composition
into a sound product creates ‘something of novel intellectual or
artistic value [and] has undoubtedly participated in the creation
of a product in which he is entitled to a right of property.’”18 The
court further held that “the sale of records was not a publication
of the work that operated to divest the orchestra of its commonlaw property right . . .[,]”19 a position echoed by the Supreme
Court of New York, New York County, more than a decade
later.20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit subsequently reconsidered an earlier decision in which it
held that “the sale of a record to the public . . . ends common-law
copyright protection[,]”21 stating that the act of putting “records
17 (1908)).
15. Id. at 258 n.6.
16. Id. at 258.
17. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 2 (repealed 1978)).
18. Id. at 258-59 (quoting Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, 194 A. 631,
635 (Pa. 1937)).
19. Id. at 259.
20. Id. (quoting Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 494 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (“At common law the public performance
of a play, exhibition of a picture or sale of a copy of the film for public
presentation did not constitute an abandonment nor deprive the owner of his
common-law rights.”)).
21. Id. (citing RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940)).
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on public sale . . . does not constitute a dedication of the right to
copy and sell the records.”22
When Congress, in response to unrest among the states in
their attempts to combat the growing ease of unlawful
reproduction of recordings, amended the Copyright Act of 1909,
sound recordings for the first time were included among the
categories of works protected by federal law, excluding those
created before the effective date of the amendment (February 15,
1972).23 In passing this amendment, the Senate and the House
of Representatives “eventually reached a compromise, deciding
that existing state common-law copyright protection for pre1972 recordings would not be preempted by the new federal
statute until . . . 75 years after the effective date of the 1971
amendment.”24 The new amendment presented the music
industry with new challenges, including “uncertainty as to how
claims of copyright infringement would be treated in different
jurisdictions” and “concern that the amendments could be read
as abrogating existing state statutes proscribing music piracy,”
as well as the fact that the amendment failed to “include a
technical definition of the term ‘publication,’ which clouded the
meaning of that term of art in the recording industry.”25
The challenges presented by the 1971 amendments were
first addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). In upholding
California’s music piracy statute against an assertion that the
state law conflicted with and was therefore preempted by the
Copyright Act, the Court:
acknowledged that the states were free to act with
regard to sound recordings precisely because
Congress had not, and in the absence of conflict
between federal and state law, the Supremacy
Clause was not a barrier to a state’s provision of
copyright protection to a work not covered under

22. Id. at 260 (quoting Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d
657, 663 (2d Cir. 1955)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 260-61 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012)).
25. Id. at 261.
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federal copyright law.26
As noted by the Court of Appeals of New York in Naxos,
The effect of Goldstein was more than an
affirmation of the states’ right to enact criminal
laws prohibiting music piracy. Its rationale
clearly deviated from the Wheaton view—that
publication divests common-law rights even in the
absence of statutory protection. Instead, the
Court relied on the rule that state common-law
copyright protection can continue beyond the
technical definition of publication in the absence
of contrary statutory authority.27
Further revision of the Copyright Act went into effect in 1978,
this time including a definition of “publication,”28 but still
applying only prospectively and thus “continuing to exclude pre1972 recordings from the scope of the statute” and again leaving
“to the states the decision how to handle the meaning and effect
of ‘publication’ for pre-1972 sound recordings.”29
After a long string of apparent victories for state-law-based
rights, the music industry suffered a temporary setback when
the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1995 that “public sale of a pre-1972
sound recording is a publication that divests the owner of
common-law copyright protection[,]” directly conflicting with the

26. Id. (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569-70 (1973)).
27. Id. at 261-62 (citing 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02(c), at 4-17 n.23).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This section of the Copyright Act reads, in
relevant part:
“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of
a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies
or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further
distribution, public performance, public display, constitutes
publication. A public performance or display of a work does
not of itself constitute publication.
Id.
29. Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 262 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
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rationale adopted in earlier cases by the Second Circuit.30 This
divergent view was met with criticism in Congress, which
subsequently amended the Copyright Act “to clarify that ‘[t]he
distribution before January 1, 1978, of a phonorecord shall not
for any purpose constitute a publication of the musical work
embodied therein.’”31 The Ninth Circuit then “acknowledged
that the intent of Congress was to ‘restore national uniformity
on this important issue by confirming the wisdom of the custom
and usage of the affected industries and of the Copyright Office
for nearly 100 years.’”32
After laying out its detailed history of American copyright
law, the Court of Appeals of New York turned to the certified
questions presented to it in Naxos. Before answering three
questions certified to it by the Second Circuit, the court noted
that, in contrast to the general rule regarding literary works
that publication terminates common-law protection:
in the realm of sound recordings, it has been the
law in this state for over 50 years that, in the
absence of federal statutory protection, the public
sale of a sound recording otherwise unprotected
by statutory copyright does not constitute a
publication sufficient to divest the owner of
common-law copyright protection.33
The thorough and reasoned opinion of the Court of Appeals
faithfully tracks the history of state copyright protection of
sound recordings and contributes substantially to the
foundation upon which this article develops the position that the
current litigation against Sirius XM is not without merit and
that Congress should, in the interest of preventing future
uncertainty, amend the Copyright Act to extend federal
copyright protection to all sound recordings regardless of the
date on which they were fixed.
30. Id. (citing La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.
1995)).
31. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2012)).
32. Id. (quoting ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir.
2000) (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S11301 (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
33. Id. at 264 (citations omitted).
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III. Federal Protections: The Copyright Act, Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, and the Copyright Royalty Board
A. The Copyright Act, Title 17 of the United States Code
The Copyright Act distinguishes between a “musical work”
and a “sound recording.”34
A musical work includes a
transcribed musical arrangement as well as “any accompanying
words.”35 A sound recording is a work “that result[s] from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not
including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which
they are embodied.”36 As noted by the Court of Appeals of New
York, sound recordings were first brought under the wing of
federal copyright protection in the 1971 amendment to the
Copyright Act, effective February 15, 1972.37
The Copyright Act preempts all state laws pertaining to
rights within the general scope of copyright.38 The Act does not,
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). This section of the Copyright Act reads, in
relevant part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
...
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; . . .
(7) sound recordings; . . .
Id.
35.
36.
37.
38.
part:

Id. § 102(a)(2).
Id. § 101.
See Naxos, 830 N.E.2d at 260.
17 U.S.C. § 301. This section of the Copyright Act reads, in relevant
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal and equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
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however, extend its preemptive powers to state statutory and
common-law rights in sound recordings fixed prior to February
15, 1972 until the same date in 2067, at which time all state
protection for such recordings will cease to exist.39 This section
also explicitly states that, despite the expiration of state
protections for pre-1972 sound recordings in 2067, no such
recording “shall be subject to copyright under this title before,
on, or after February 15, 2067.”40 This period of 95 years is
equivalent to the duration of protection that would have been
afforded such works under the Copyright Act had they been
initially fixed on the effective date of the 1971 amendments.41
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act contains “safe
harbor” provisions that protect certain categories of internet
service providers who would otherwise be subject to liability for
copyright infringement relating to post-1972 recordings posted
on their networks by users.42 While the safe harbor provision
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State. . . .
(c) With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15,
1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or
statutes of any state shall not be annulled or limited by this
title until February 15, 2067. The preemptive provisions of
subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and remedies
pertaining to any cause of action arising from undertakings
commenced
on
and
after
February
15,
2067.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no sound
recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to
copyright under this title before, on, or after February 15,
2067.
Id.
39. See id. § 301(a).
40. See id. § 301(c).
41. Id. § 303.
42. Id. § 512. This “safe harbor” provision, found in subsection (a), states
that, if certain conditions regarding the manner in which copyrighted material
is transmitted and/or stored are met:

9
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does not apply to satellite radio services such as Sirius XM, its
treatment in courts is instructive with regard to the manner in
which state-law-based property rights to pre-1972 sound
recordings may be enforced. In New York, the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division has held that the safe harbor provision does
not preclude the assertion of a common-law copyright claim.43
This holding stands as an explicit contradiction of a prior holding
in a federal court in New York, which ruled that the DMCA was
not affected by section 301(c) of the Copyright Act and thus could
be read as precluding a common-law copyright claim against a
qualifying service provider.44

A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the
provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for,
material through a system or network controlled or operated
by or for the service provider, or by reason of the intermediate
and transient storage of that material in the course of such
transmitting, routing, or providing connections . . . .
Id. § 512(a).
43. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d
106 (App. Div. 2013), which reads, in relevant part:
Congress explicitly, and very clearly, separated the universe
of sound recordings into two categories, one for works ‘fixed’
after February 15, 1972, to which it granted federal copyright
protection, and one for those fixed before that date, to which
it did not. Defendant has pointed to nothing in the Copyright
Act or its legislative history which prevents us from
concluding that Congress meant to apply the DMCA to the
former category, but not the latter.
Id. at 111.
44. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), which reads, in relevant part:
Read in context, section 301(c) is an anti-preemption
provision ensuring that the grant of federal copyright
protection did not interfere with common law or state rights
established prior to 1972. But section 301(c) does not prohibit
all subsequent regulation of pre-1972 recordings. . . . The
plain meaning of the DMCA’s safe harbors, read in light of
their purpose, covers both state and federal copyright claims.
Thus, the DMCA applies to sound recordings fixed prior to
February 15, 1972.
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The analysis employed by the Appellate Division in Escape
Media Group is both logical and thorough. The court reasoned
that the safe harbor provision of the DMCA must be read and
interpreted in light of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.45 As
such, the court noted, interpreting the DMCA as applying to
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972 would entail
“an implicit modification of the plain language of section
Section 301(c) states, “With respect to sound
301(c).”46
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any state shall
not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15,
2067.”47 As the court astutely recognized, allowing the DMCA
to bar actions for infringement on an owner’s rights to a pre-1972
sound recording would in fact be (at least) a limitation of those
rights, and “[a]ny material limitation, especially the elimination
of the right to assert a common-law infringement claim, is
violative of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.”48
Additionally, the court in Escape Media Group discussed
(but did not opine as to the authoritative effect of) a report from
the Copyright Office to the House of Representatives
“recommending that Congress extend federal copyright
protection to sound recordings fixed on or before February 15,
1972, and that the safe harbor provisions of § 512 be applicable
to such recordings.”49 As noted by the court, “the report took the
position that Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes was wrongly
decided and that congressional action was necessary before pre1972 recordings were embraced by the DMCA.”50 This report
bases its recommendation on the principle “that bringing pre1972 sound recordings into the federal copyright system serves
the interests of consistency and certainty . . .” as “there are a
variety of legal regimes governing protection of pre-1972 sound

Id. at 641-42.
45. See Escape Media Group, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
46. Id.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012).
48. Escape Media Group, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
49. Id. at 109-12 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS (2011), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf).
50. Id. at 109.
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recordings in the various states, and the scope of protection and
of exceptions and limitations to that protection is unclear.”51
Indeed, if pre-1972 sound recordings are afforded federal
copyright protection, much litigation will be avoided and the
process of securing broadcast rights to such recordings will be
greatly simplified, to the substantial benefit of copyright owners,
radio services, and the public generally.52
C. The Copyright Royalty Board
The Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) is “a panel of federal
judges that regulates some forms of licensing.”53 Under the
Copyright Act, satellite digital audio radio services (SDARS) like
Sirius XM Radio need not negotiate licenses with individual
copyright owners; instead, the Act affords such services a
statutory license for which the service must pay a fee.54 The
CRB periodically promulgates regulations that establish the
royalties that statutory license holders must pay.55 “The CRB
has designated SoundExchange as the sole entity in the United
States to collect digital performance royalties from statutory
license users and to distribute those royalties to performing
artists and copyright owners.”56 The regulations promulgated
by the CRB regarding calculation and payment of statutory
royalties are directly at issue in one of the current lawsuits
against Sirius XM.57

51. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 49.
52. See infra Part VI.
53. Sisario, supra note 4.
54. Complaint ¶¶ 13-14, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,
No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 26, 2013) [hereinafter SoundExchange v.
Sirius XM Complaint]; see 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2) (2012).
55. See SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶ 2.
56. Id. ¶ 10.
57. See infra Part V. The plaintiffs in the SoundExchange case allege that
Sirius XM has improperly reduced the revenue base against which it calculates
royalties owed to SoundExchange according to the regulations promulgated by
the CRB. See SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶¶
42-47.
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IV. California’s Protection of Property Rights in Pre-1972
Sound Recordings
California has traditionally protected property rights, both
via statute and at common law, to sound recordings fixed prior
to February 15, 1972.58 California courts have long recognized
that the separation in the federal Copyright Act of sound
recordings from musical compositions allows states to protect
those examples of the former, fixed prior to February 15, 1972,
that are not within the scope of federal protection.59 California
has codified its longstanding common-law protection of property
rights to sound recordings.60 It is settled policy in California that
58. See Capital Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 1 (“For
over 40 years, sound recordings have been protected by California common law,
and for over 30 years they have been provided protection under Section 980 of
the California Civil Code.”).
59. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390 (Ct. App.
1977), which reads, in relevant part:
A recorded performance embodies two distinct bundles of
legal rights: (1) rights in the musical composition itself, the
tune and lyrics, and (2) rights in the recording “fixing” the
performance of that musical composition.
Recorded
performances, however, cannot legally exist without the right
to reproduce mechanically the underlying musical
compositions. Early in this century it was recognized that if
composers had an unlimited right to control the “mechanical
reproduction” of musical compositions there was a danger of
“establishing a great musical monopoly” in the mechanical
reproduction of music. Congress therefore incorporated into
the 1909 Copyright Act a comprehensive plan to recognize
the rights of composers yet “prevent the establishment of a
great trade monopoly.” A key element of this plan is the
compulsory licensing provision.
Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
60. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 980 (1984). This section reads, in relevant part:
(a) . . . (2) The author of an original work of authorship
consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to
February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until
February 15, 2047, as against all persons except one who
independently makes or duplicates another sound recording
that does not directly or indirectly recapture the actual
sounds fixed in such prior sound recording, but consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even

13

2015

SIRIUS XM RADIO, INC., DEFENDANT

1029

the need to foster “invention and free competition” necessitates
legal protection of the ownership interest in sound recordings.61
A. The Copyright Act and Preemption
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that
the individual states remain free to regulate the copying of pre1972 sound recordings as they see fit, drawing a distinction
between the copyright realm and that of patents, in which
federal law preempts contrary state statutes.62 The distinction,
for Supremacy Clause purposes, appears to derive from the
nature and purpose of federal protection:
In regard to mechanical configurations, Congress
had balanced the need to encourage innovation
and originality of invention against the need to
insure competition in the sale of identical or
substantially identical products. The standards
established for granting federal patent protection
to machines thus indicated not only which articles
in this category Congress wished to protect, but
which configurations it wished to remain free.
The application of state law in these cases to
prevent the copying of articles which did not meet
though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained
in the prior sound recording.
Id. § 980(a)(2).
61. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App.
1969), which reads, in relevant part:
It is reasonable to conclude that permitting such
appropriation would discourage invention and free
competition—and that those engaged in the recording
industry would be inclined not to utilize their skill and
efforts, and expend large amounts of money, in producing
unique recordings, but would wait for a recording to be
produced, and then duplicate it and sell it, at maximum profit
and with minimum effort and expense.
Id. at 806.
62. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 569-70 (1973).
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the requirements for federal protection disturbed
the careful balance which Congress had drawn
and thereby necessarily gave way under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
No
comparable conflict between state law and federal
law arises in the case of recordings of musical
performances. In regard to this category of
‘Writings,’ Congress has drawn no balance;
rather, it has left the area unattended, and no
reason exists why the State should not be free to
act.63
Congress saw fit to protect certain types of products with patent
law, to the exclusion of state protection of other types, while the
Copyright Act protects products of the same type differently
depending on the date of production, leaving the door open for
the states to extend protection to the same type of product
regardless of the date of production.64
Courts in California have found that Civil Code Section
980(a)(1) fits within the federal scheme of allowing state
protections that do not conflict with the Copyright Act. “The
Supreme Court has held that states retain concurrent power
under the Copyright Clause of the Constitution to afford
copyright protection to the works of authors as long as such
protection does not conflict with federal law.”65 “Thus, state laws
are subject to federal preemption only if they create ‘legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights’ within the general scope of federal copyright law.”66
These courts have employed a two-part test utilized by the Ninth
Circuit to determine whether state protection is preempted by
the Copyright Act.67 “Preemption occurs when: (1) the work at
issue comes within the subject matter of copyright and (2) the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Trenton v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 1416, 1422-23 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (citing Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546) (finding “not fixed in any tangible
medium of expression” language in CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) “provides
copyright protection outside the scope of that found in the federal statute”).
66. Id. at 1423 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012)).
67. Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (C.D. Cal.
2000).
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rights granted under state law are ‘equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright’ set forth
in the Act.”68 Like subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not
conflict with the Copyright Act.
While the second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test
states that, in order to avoid preemption, the state claim must
contain an “extra element,”69 this prong comes into play only if
subsection (a)(2) does not provide “protection outside the scope
of that found in the federal statute.”70 As in the case of
subsection (a)(1), the plain language of subsection (a)(2) places
the protection offered by the statute outside the scope of the
federal Copyright Act. While the Copyright Act protects only
sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, Civil Code
Section 980(a)(2) protects the “exclusive ownership” right of
“[t]he author of an original work of authorship consisting of a
sound recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972 . . . .”71
As an aside, by the language of this test, subsection (a)(2) may
(if extended) arguably continue to offer protection outside the
scope of the Copyright Act even after February 15, 2067, the date
on which the Act extinguishes all previously-enjoyed state
common-law and statutory protections for pre-1972 sound
recordings.72 The continued validity (or lack thereof) of this test
after 2067, however, is irrelevant to the current litigation and
therefore outside the scope of this article. For the purposes of
this discussion, the federal statute can be viewed as a mere
acknowledgement that state protections for pre-1972 sound
recordings are indeed outside the scope of federal copyright
protection and therefore not subject to preemption.
B. Defining Publication – Does it Matter?
As observed above, when Congress initially amended the
Copyright Act, it failed to include a definition of the act of
“publication,” which was seen as the act “which divested
68. Id. (quoting Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d
973, 976 (9th Cir. 1987)).
69. Id.
70. Trenton, 865 F. Supp. at 1423.
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (West 2014).
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012).
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common law rights” as far back as 1834.73 In California, as in
other states, this ambiguity found its way to the forefront of
much litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, applying California law, ruled in 1995 that
publication occurred, and common-law protection ceased, when
the owner of a recording sold copies of that recording.74 This
decision stood in contrast to earlier rulings by the Second Circuit
that sale of recordings did not constitute publication,75 which
contradicted a previous ruling by the same court that sale of
recordings did in fact constitute publication.76
Faced with the multitude of interpretations of what did and
did not constitute publication, Congress amended the Copyright
Act once again in 1997, adopting the rationale of the more recent
Second Circuit cases at least for some recordings, depending on
when they were sold to the public.77 The Ninth Circuit then
revisited the issue, recognizing that “‘the result of our holding in
La Cienega has been subsequently changed by Congress’
passage and enactment of [the amendment].’”78 In passing and
enacting this amendment, Congress recognized a strong interest
in establishing uniform standards in this area of law:
“‘overturning the La Cienega decision will restore national
uniformity on this important issue by confirming the wisdom of
the custom and usage of the affected industries and of the
Copyright Office for nearly 100 years.’”79
The issue of publication, while important under state laws
to determine whether the owner of a recording has abandoned
his or her common-law rights, does not factor into the
73. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 257-58
(2005); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
74. La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 1995).
75. Capitol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955);
see Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aff’d per curiam, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976).
76. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2012) (“[D]istribution before January 1, 1978, of a
phonorecord shall not for any purpose constitute a publication of any musical
work . . . embodied therein.”).
78. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Batjac Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223,
1235 (9th Cir. 1998)).
79. Id. at 690 (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S11301 (1997) (statement of
Senator Hatch)).
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determination of whether state copyright protection for pre-1972
sound recordings is preempted by federal law.80 One may
wonder, then, why the issue of publication must be passed upon
at all in a discussion of the validity of state protection for pre1972 recordings. It is precisely that need for national uniformity
touted by Congress in the passage of its 1997 amendment that
makes this issue material to any discussion of property rights in
pre-1972 sound recordings. With each state individually left to
decide what protections (if any) to offer to owners of pre-1972
sound recordings and what acts (if any) by those owners
terminate those protections, it is no wonder that the issue of the
rights of owners of pre-1972 recordings is far from settled.
V. The Lawsuits: Is Sirius XM Doomed?
A. SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. and the
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Plaintiff SoundExchange is “an independent nonprofit
organization” designated by the CRB “as the sole entity in the
United States to collect digital performance royalties from
statutory license users and to distribute those royalties to
performing artists and copyright owners.”81 SoundExchange
alleges four separate counts in its complaint.82 Counts two and
three, which allege underpayment of royalties based on
exclusion of revenue from certain subscription packages,83 and
count four, which alleges failure to make late fee payments,84 are
outside the scope of this article. Count one, though, alleges
“Violation of 37 C.F.R. § 382.13(a) and 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(B) –
Underpayment Based on Reduction of Revenue Purportedly
Corresponding to Use of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings[,]”85 placing
the lawsuit squarely within the framework of this discussion.
Under the Copyright Act, users of the statutory license86 are
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.06(B) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012)).
SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 42-63.
Id. ¶¶ 48-59.
Id. ¶¶ 60-63.
Id. ¶¶ 42-47.
17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2) (2012).
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required to pay royalties to copyright owners at a rate set
periodically by the CRB.87 “The . . . rates and terms determined
by the Copyright Royalty Judges shall . . . be binding on all
copyright owners of sound recordings and entities performing
sound recordings affected by this paragraph . . . .”88 This section
also includes an opt-out clause that allows copyright owners and
those who perform sound recordings to negotiate their own
licensing agreements.89 Since Sirius XM has taken advantage of
the statutory license and does not negotiate individual licensing
agreements, it is required to pay royalties to SoundExchange at
the rate set by the CRB for its use of all covered sound
recordings.90 The issue that must be resolved, then, is whether
that category of recordings for which Sirius XM must pay
royalties includes pre-1972 sound recordings or, stated more
precisely, whether Sirius XM may lawfully reduce its royalty
payments for revenues purportedly connected to the
performance of such recordings.
Counsel for SoundExchange took care in its complaint not
to allege that the pre-1972 sound recordings in question are
protected by federal copyright, a wise move considering that the
Copyright Act plainly excludes such recordings from federal
protection91 and its statutory licensing provisions can
reasonably be read to apply only to recordings protected by
federal copyright.92 Instead, SoundExchange relies on language
in the regulations promulgated by the CRB to bolster its claim
that Sirius XM did not properly exclude pre-1972 recordings
from its calculation of royalty payments.93
The crux of
SoundExchange’s first cause of action is the claim that Sirius
XM has been improperly applying to its calculation an exclusion

87. Id. § 114(f)(1)(B).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 114(f)(3) (“License agreements voluntarily negotiated at any time
between 1 or more copyright owners of sound recordings and 1 or more entities
performing sound recordings shall be given effect in lieu of any decision by the
Librarian of Congress or determination by the Copyright Royalty Judges.”).
90. Id. § 114(f)(1)(B).
91. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 260 (N.Y.
2005) (citing Pub. L. 92-140 § 3 (1971)).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2), (f)(1)(B) (2012).
93. See SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶¶ 1624.
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not recognized as legitimate under the regulations promulgated
by the CRB.94
Under the scheme of statutory license and royalty payments
administered by the CRB, “Sirius XM’s payments to
SoundExchange are calculated as a percentage of Sirius XM’s
Gross Revenues, a term defined in 37 C.F.R. § 382.11.”95 As
alleged by the plaintiff, “[n]one of the regulatory exclusions in
effect during the relevant time period permitted Sirius XM to
reduce its reported Gross Revenues by an amount purportedly
attributable to its performances of pre-1972 sound recordings.”96
The plaintiffs allege, and Sirius XM does not dispute, that
during the relevant period (2007-2012) Sirius XM “had reduced
its reported Gross Revenues by between 10% and 15% of its
subscription revenue on the theory that it corresponded to
performances of pre-1972 sound recordings.”97 According to the
CRB, “[t]he current Gross Revenues definition does not
expressly recognize such an exclusion, which is not surprising
given that there is no revenue recognition for the performance of
pre-1972 works.”98 The CRB did acknowledge that reduction of
royalty payments for pre-1972 recordings may be appropriate
moving forward, prescribing a method of calculation quite
different from that employed by Sirius XM:
94. Id. ¶¶ 21-24.
95. Id. ¶ 44; see 37 C.F.R. § 382.11 (2015), which reads, in relevant part:
(1) Gross Revenues . . . shall be comprised of the following:
(i) Subscription revenue recognized by Licensee directly from
U.S. subscribers for Licensee’s SDARS . . .
(3) Gross Revenues shall exclude: . . .
(vi) Revenues recognized by Licensee for the provision of . . .
(D) Channels, programming, products and/or other services
for which the performance of sound recordings . . . is exempt
from any license requirement or is separately licensed,
including by a statutory license . . . .
Id.
96. SoundExchange v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 54, at ¶ 21.
97. Id. ¶ 23 (citing Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting
Subscription Services and Satelite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg.
23,054, 23,080 (Apr. 17, 2013)).
98. Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting Subscription
Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054,
23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013).
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As with directly licensed works, pre-1972
recordings are not licensed under the statutory
royalty regime and should not factor into
determining the statutory royalty obligation. But,
. . . revenue exclusion is not the proper means . . .
Rather, the proper approach is to calculate a
deduction from the total royalty obligation . . . .
The question then becomes how to calculate the
correct deduction. . . . To be allowable, a deduction
for pre-1972 recordings must be precise and the
methodology transparent. . . . To be eligible for a
deduction of the Pre-1972 Recording Share, Sirius
XM must, on a monthly basis, identify to
SoundExchange by title and recording artist those
recordings for which it is claiming the deduction.99
Sirius XM filed a motion to dismiss this action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to
stay the action.100 Sirius XM argues essentially that the district
court should either dismiss or stay the claim under the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction.101 “That doctrine permits a court to
‘refer’ actions to an administrative agency when the core
questions raised in a lawsuit ‘require[] the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body.’”102 Sirius XM
argues that answering the questions presented in this case
“requires an understanding of the proper interpretation and
application of the CRB’s own regulations . . .” placing the issue
“squarely within the scope and purposes of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine . . . .”103
In response to Sirius XM’s request that the district court
99. Id.
100. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius
XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 16, 2013).
101. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6,
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed
Oct. 16, 2013).
102. Id. at 2 (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64
(1956)).
103. Id.
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apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, SoundExchange
argues that the doctrine “has no application to the claims at
issue.”104 The plaintiff points out that “courts have declined to
refer matters to agencies where a case calls for the application
According to
of regulations that are unambiguous.”105
SoundExchange, this is the sort of function that occurs “in the
vast majority of cases that fall ‘within the conventional
competence of courts[,]’”106 and as such, this matter should not
be referred back to the CRB for further interpretation of the
pertinent regulations. SoundExchange points to the CRB’s own
language in support of its argument that, not only are the
regulations in question unambiguous, but the CRB has already
considered the issue of Sirius XM’s interpretation of those
regulations and held the defendant’s revenue-reduction scheme
to be improper.107 According to SoundExchange, “it has long
been recognized that referral to an agency on primary
jurisdiction grounds is improper where the relevant agency has
already addressed the question at issue or otherwise clarified
how its regulations should be applied in a given context.”108
Counsel for Sirius XM counters with the argument that the
regulations promulgated by the CRB “unambiguously” support
their client’s nonpayment of royalties “for programming ‘exempt
from any license requirement’ . . .” a category of programming
that includes “performances of pre-1972 recordings . . . .”109
Furthermore, Sirius XM states that the CRB “prescribed a
method for calculating such exemptions . . . . that is nearly
104. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1,
SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed
Dec. 2, 2013).
105. Id. at 8 (citing Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 778
F.2d 1365, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1985)).
106. Id. (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832,
838 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
107. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting
Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg.
23,054, 23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013)).
108. Id. at 8 (citing United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64
(1956)).
109. Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to
Dismiss at 1, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting Determination of Rates and Terms of
Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services,
78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013)).
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identical, both in approach and economic consequence, to the
methodology utilized by Sirius XM for the period in dispute.”110
According to Sirius XM, the claims made by SoundExchange are
based “on a meritless accounting quibble . . .”111 and the essential
dispute comes down to Sirius XM calculating its royalty
payments using the same formula as that prescribed by the CRB
with the numbers in a different order and thus reaching the
same ultimate calculation.112
Interestingly, what counsel for Sirius XM fails to address in
either of its memoranda is the language of the CRB prescribing
the method by which the service provider may properly calculate
and obtain a deduction from its royalty obligation related to pre1972 sound recordings.113 The CRB stated that the method by
which Sirius XM calculated such a deduction was both
incomplete and improper.114 “To be allowable, a deduction . . .
must be precise and the methodology transparent . . . . To be
eligible for a deduction of the Pre-1972 Recording Share, Sirius
XM must, on a monthly basis, identify to SoundExchange by title
and recording artist those recordings for which it is claiming the
deduction.”115
What the CRB did not expressly determine was whether
Sirius XM’s incorrect method resulted in actual underpayment
of royalties. Even if the CRB had made such a determination,
though, SoundExchange would still need to turn to the court
system to obtain a remedy. As the plaintiffs outline in their
memorandum, the CRB, which has no power to enforce the
regulations it promulgates, “cannot award SoundExchange
damages . . . . Rather, to obtain a damages award,
SoundExchange would have to return to this Court.”116 In such
110. Id. at 2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 7 (“In short, Sirius XM’s approach . . . was mathematically
equivalent to what the [CRB] made explicit . . . except that rather than
multiplying A x B x C, the [CRB] determination calls for multiplying A x C x
B. . . . [T]he economic results are substantively identical.”).
113. See supra note 98, and accompanying text.
114. Determination of Rates and Terms of Preexisting Subscription
Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054,
23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013) (“[R]evenue exclusion is not the proper means . . . .”).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 104, at 16.
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circumstances, SoundExchange argues, where the controversy
falls “‘within the conventional competence of courts[,]’”
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not
proper.117
In a memorandum opinion filed August 26, 2014, United
States District Judge Richard J. Leon granted Sirius XM’s
motion and stayed the action pending a decision by the CRB.118
As Judge Leon stated:
It is true that the Satellite II panel set forth a
different mechanism for dealing with pre-1972
sound recordings than Sirius XM had used
previously, but whether Sirius XM’s approach was
improper such that it owes SoundExchange
additional fees for times past is an open question
of interpretation and policy.119
Judge Leon noted that, if the CRB rules that Sirius XM did in
fact reach an improper calculation of royalties, “SoundExchange
can seek damages in this court.”120 The CRB, which has already
determined that Sirius XM’s method of calculation was not
proper, must now determine whether that method means Sirius
XM owes Sound Exchange any additional royalties for the period
in question.
Sirius XM’s argument that its method of calculation will
lead to “economic results [that] are substantively identical”121 to
those that will be achieved by the method prescribed by the CRB
may very well be sound. This article takes no position on the
accounting accuracy of the parties to this litigation. Of course,
if the pre-1972 sound recordings for which Sirius XM seeks a
royalty reduction were included under the protections of the
federal Copyright Act, their performance would be subject to the
117. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d
832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
118. Memorandum Opinion at 12, SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM
Radio, Inc., No. 1:13CV01290 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 20, 2013).
119. Id. at 10-11.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Further Support of its Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 109, at 7.
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statutory licensing scheme, and we would have no “accounting
quibble”122 and, in all likelihood, this litigation would have been
avoided altogether.
B. Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.
The plaintiffs in the Capitol Records case (Capitol Records,
Sony Music Entertainment, UMG Recordings, Warner Music
Group, and ABKCO Music & Records) collectively “own the
majority of commercially exploited recorded music in the United
States[] . . . .”123 Among the artists whose pre-1972 recordings
are owned by the plaintiffs are “the Beatles, the Beach Boys, the
Rolling Stones, Bob Dylan, Jimi Hendrix, the Eagles, Led
Zeppelin, the Temptations, the Supremes, Stevie Wonder,
Buddy Holly, Chuck Berry, Marvin Gaye, Nat King Cole, Otis
Redding, Aretha Franklin, Simon & Garfunkel, Patsy Cline, and
Louis Armstrong.”124 The plaintiffs allege that Sirius XM
“publicly performs thousands . . .” of their pre-1972 recordings
each day and that the plaintiffs “have never authorized Sirius
XM . . .” to do so.125 The plaintiffs claim five separate causes of
action: violation of California Civil Code section 980(a)(2),
common law misappropriation, statutory and common law
unfair competition, conversion, and declaratory relief.126 It is
the plaintiffs’ first cause of action, based on California’s
statutory protection of ownership rights in pre-1972 sound
recordings, that is central to this discussion.
California Civil Code section 980(a)(2) provides an
“exclusive ownership” right for the “author of an original work
of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior
to February 15, 1972 . . . until February 15, 2047[] . . . .”127 The
plaintiffs therefore claim that they “have all the exclusive rights
to exploit those recordings, including, but not limited to, the
rights to manufacture, copy, sell, distribute, broadcast, and
publicly perform their Pre-72 Recordings, including by digital
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 2.
Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 3-7, 10.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
Id. ¶¶ 29-56.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (West 2014).
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transmission[]”128 and that “Defendants do not have the right to
reproduce or publicly perform [Plaintiffs’] Pre-72 Recordings and
have never compensated Plaintiffs for Defendants’ exploitation
of their Pre-72 Recordings.”129 In addition to actual damages
and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs seek to recover “exemplary
and punitive damages” because “Defendants are guilty of
oppression, fraud or malice[] . . . .”130
The plaintiffs note that California’s protection of property
rights in pre-1972 sound recordings is not identical to that
initially offered to post-1972 recordings under the federal
Copyright Act.131 As noted by the California Court of Appeal,
Second District, Division 1, record companies “expend[]
substantial effort, skill and money in selecting performing
artists and obtaining the exclusive right to record their
performances[] . . . .”132 As noted by the plaintiffs:
[The] broad protection . . . is consistent with the
recognition . . . of critical, important public policy
interests . . . includ[ing] . . . ensuring that record
companies receive compensation . . . as well as
ensuring that the owners of sound recordings
possess powerful . . . remedies against those who
seek to unfairly appropriate and profit from such

128.
129.
130.
131.

Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 24, which reads, in relevant part:
Unlike the inclusive scope of protection afforded to PreRecordings (sic) by California state law, Congress initially
limited the federal sound recording copyright to include
certain of the exclusive rights conferred on other works . . .
and to exclude the right to publicly perform sound recordings.
California law, by contrast, has never delimited, either
expressly or implicitly, the scope of common law or statutory
protection of Pre-72 Recordings, and did not exclude the right
of public performance from the rights of “exclusive
ownership’” in Pre-72 Recordings.

Id.
132. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798, 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969).
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artistic performances.133
The interests touted by the plaintiffs are quite similar to those
recognized by Congress when, in 1995, it granted to the owners
of copyrighted sound recordings the exclusive right to broadcast
such recordings.134
Interestingly, the text of Civil Code Section 980(a)(2) does
not contain language similar to that found in subsection (1) that
seems to reserve such an exclusive performance right.
Subsection (1) reserves “an exclusive ownership in the
representation or expression . . .” of an “original work of
authorship that is not fixed in any tangible medium of
expression . . .” to the author of the work.135 Subsection (2),
however, while reserving “an exclusive ownership” to “the
author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound
recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972,” is written
in more general terms and does not include the “representation
or expression” qualifier found in subsection (1).
Reading these two subsections together, as courts often will,
one may reasonably come to the conclusion that the California
legislature deliberately omitted the “representation or
expression” language from subsection (2) with the intent of not
reserving such an exclusive performance right for pre-1972
sound recordings. If the statute is to be interpreted in this
manner, Sirius XM’s broadcasting of such recordings in
California may not give rise to civil liability for infringement on
the exclusive ownership right of the plaintiffs. This reading of
Section 980, however, would not be proper, for it would implicitly
endorse the previously dispelled notion that the act of selling
copies of such recordings constitutes “publication” and divests
their owner of exclusive property rights.136 Following this
analysis, the language of subsection (2) would seem to support
the plaintiffs’ claim that Sirius XM’s broadcasting of the
133. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 25 (citing
Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06).
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012); H.R. Rep. No. 104-274 (1995).
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
136. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Batjac Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160 F.3d 1223,
1235 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Part IV.B., supra.
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recordings in question without the plaintiffs’ permission is
unlawful. The plaintiffs point to the issues highlighted by
Congress when it passed the Digital Performance Rights in
Sound Recordings Act137 as evidence of the need to continue to
recognize the exclusive ownership rights held under California
law.138
On September 23, 2014, the plaintiffs requested that the
court take judicial notice of an order issued by Judge Philip S.
Gutierrez of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California in Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio,
Inc.139 in connection with the plaintiffs’ motion for jury
instruction.140 The plaintiffs had previously requested that the
court issue the following jury instruction:
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012). This section of the Copyright Act states
that “the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights . . . in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission.” Id.
138. Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 27. The
plaintiffs quote at length from H.R. Rep. No. 104-274 (1995):
Trends within the music industry, as well as the
telecommunications and information services industries,
suggest that digital transmission of sound recordings is likely
to become a very important outlet for the performance of
recorded music in the near future. . . . These new digital
transmission technologies may permit consumers to enjoy
performances of a broader range of higher-quality recordings
than has ever before been possible. . . . However, in the
absence of appropriate copyright protection in the digital
environment, the creation of new sound recordings and
musical works could be discouraged, ultimately denying the
public some of the potential benefits of the new digital
transmission technologies.
Current copyright law is
inadequate to address all of the issues raised by these new
technologies dealing with the digital transmission of sound
recordings and musical works and, thus, to protect the
livelihoods of the recording artists, songwriters, record
companies, music publishers and others who depend upon
revenues derived from traditional record sales.
Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 27 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 104-274 (1995)).
139. No. 2:13CV05693 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 6, 2013).
140. Court’s Ruling on Submitted Matter, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jury
Instruction, Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC520981 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2014).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/6

28

1044

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:3

The owner of a sound recording “fixed” (i.e.,
recorded) prior to February 15, 1972, possesses a
property interest and exclusive ownership rights
in that sound recording. This property interest
and the ownership rights under California law
include the exclusive right to publicly perform, or
authorize others to perform, the sound recording
by means of digital transmission—whether by
satellite transmission, over the Internet, through
mobile smartphone applications, or otherwise.141
After the plaintiffs’ motion for jury instruction in Capitol
Records was argued and under submission, the court in Flo &
Eddie issued an order granting summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, ruling that the exclusive ownership right in a sound
recording under Civil Code Section 980 includes a public
performance right.142
On October 14, 2014, California Superior Court Judge Mary
H. Strobel, taking judicial notice of the summary judgment order
in Flo & Eddie, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for jury
instruction, ruling that Civil Code Section 980 does afford the
owner of a sound recording an exclusive public performance
right.143 Judge Strobel found “significant that the California
legislature specifically adopted one exception to exclusive
ownership for recording ‘covers’ found in federal copyright law,
‘nearly word-for-word’ but did not specifically adopt the other
exception found in that law for public performance rights.”144
Judge Strobel thus concluded that the legislature intended this
“cover” exception to be the only exception to Section 980’s
exclusive ownership rights. Since a public performance right
was not “specifically excluded,” the court ruled that such a right
is included in the exclusive ownership rights of pre-1972 sound
recordings.145
Sirius XM is expected to appeal the district court’s ruling in
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Flo & Eddie.146 In light of the fact that the court in Capitol
Records was persuaded to change its initial “tentative ruling” on
the plaintiffs’ motion for jury instruction,147 a ruling on Sirius
XM’s anticipated appeal in Flo & Eddie has the potential to
significantly impact the progress of the litigation in the Capitol
Records case. In any event, the end of the recent flourish of
litigation against Sirius XM for its use of pre-1972 sound
recordings does not appear imminent.
VI. Conclusion: The Ramifications of Enforcing Property Rights
to Pre-1972 Recordings
As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldstein, because a
state’s copyright protection is effective only within the borders
of that state, it is less valuable from an economic standpoint
than federal protection, as residents may simply cross state lines
to obtain copies of works that would be unlawful in their home
state. The Court, however, opined that this lesser value does not
remove from states the power to offer whatever limited
protection they can to sound recordings not protected by the
Copyright Act:
The interests of a State which grants copyright
protection may . . . be adversely affected by other
States that do not; individuals who wish to
purchase a copy of a work protected in their own
State will be able to buy unauthorized copies in
other States where no protection exists. However,
this conflict is neither so inevitable nor so severe
as to compel the conclusion, that state power has
been relinquished to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Congress. Obviously when some States do not
grant copyright protection – and most do not –
that circumstance reduces the economic value of a
state copyright, but it will hardly render the
146. See Ben Sisario, Sirius XM Loses Suit on Royalties for Oldies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2014, at B3.
147. Court’s Ruling on Submitted Matter, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Jury
Instruction, Capitol Records, LLC v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. BC520981 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2014).
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copyright worthless.148
Much has changed, though, in the many years since the
Goldstein decision. As pointed out by counsel for the plaintiffs
in the Capitol Records case, “music consumption habits have
changed, and greater numbers of people listen to music via
digital radio channels in lieu of purchasing music on CDs or
digital music files . . . .”149 It is this fundamental change in the
way many of us consume this product that necessitates greater
protection for the owners of pre-1972 sound recordings.
While the wisdom of extinguishing all state protections for
pre-1972 sound recordings in 2067150 is not central to this
discussion, there is a greater consideration in play. With the
advent of new methods of music consumption, state protections
are already considerably less valuable than they were in 1973
when the Supreme Court in Goldstein acknowledged that state
protections were of lesser economic value than that offered by
the Copyright Act.151 Whereas a person who wished to consume
unauthorized reproductions in 1973 had to travel to a state that
did not offer copyright protection to sound recordings in order to
do so, the same person today need only turn on his or her
satellite radio. If the transmissions received by that radio are
protected only in some states and not in others, we will continue
to see disputes arise between SDARS who argue they are only
doing what the law allows, owners of sound recordings who
argue they are only protecting their creations, investments, and
sources of income, and consumers of music who stand to be the
ultimate losers, whether due to increased subscription fees (if for
nothing else than to cover the cost of litigation) or decreased
access to some of the most popular music ever recorded.
Bringing all sound recordings, regardless of the date on
which they were originally fixed, under the wing of federal
protection would go a long way toward alleviating those
concerns. As noted by the CRB, “pre-1972 recordings are not
licensed under the statutory royalty regime . . . .”152 Thus, even
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973).
Capitol Records v. Sirius XM Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 13.
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012).
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558.
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if state copyright protections are in place for such recordings, the
owners of the recordings and SDARS are left with unattractive
options: negotiate independent licensing/royalty agreements,
continue to periodically litigate their differences, or remove the
recordings from satellite radio broadcasts altogether. Amending
the Copyright Act to embrace all sound recordings would allow
SDARS to take advantage of the ease and convenience of the
statutory license, thereby eliminating the need to litigate issues
of state-law-based rights and damages or spend time and other
valuable resources negotiating licensing agreements with
individual holders (or collectives thereof) of state-protected
copyrights.
When it endeavored to define for the first time the term
“publication” for copyright purposes, Congress touted as a
motivating force the need for consistency and “national
uniformity” in the copyright realm.153 It is precisely this need
for consistency that warrants amending the Copyright Act once
more to eliminate the distinction between sound recordings fixed
before February 15, 1972 and those fixed from that date forward.
The Copyright Office, in fact, has cited specifically “the interests
of consistency and certainty[] . . .” in recommending that “sound
recordings made before February 15, 1972 be brought into the
federal copyright regime.”154 The Copyright Office notes that,
with pre-1972 recordings protected at the state level, “the scope
of protection and of exceptions and limitations to that protection
is unclear.”155
Examples of the uncertainty bemoaned in the Copyright
Office’s report abound in the current litigation against Sirius
XM Radio. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia recently stayed a case that, depending on one’s point
of view, can in good faith be framed as either a “meritless
accounting quibble”156 or a concerted scheme to systematically
defraud a nonprofit organization tasked by the federal
Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054,
23,073 (Apr. 17, 2013).
153. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S11301 (1997) (statement of Senator Hatch)).
154. Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/docs/sound/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
155. Id.
156. See supra note 110.
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government with the collection and distribution of royalty
payments. While the parties to the action are in substantial
agreement as to what authority governs the controversy, each
party has interpreted the language of that authority as
unambiguous against its opponent. The parties are unable even
to agree as to what governing body should preside over the
matter.
Regrettably, resolution of this matter, whether by the CRB
or the court in favor of one party or by extrajudicial settlement,
is unlikely to curb future conflict. A number of issues would
remain to be determined in future litigation. If Sirius XM must
settle (or pay damages), is the Copyright Act’s distinction
between sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 and
those fixed from that date forward essentially meaningless?
Must the CRB expressly rule on each conflict, or could the courts
become the exclusive forum for the resolution of royalty
disputes? If owners of pre-1972 sound recordings are unable to
vindicate their claimed rights under federal regulations, do they
then follow the lead of the plaintiffs in the Capitol Records case
in asserting their claims under state laws? The interplay
between the issues in Capitol Records and the SoundExchange
case will come to the forefront in the event that the plaintiffs are
unable to prevail on their federal claims.
On the opposite coast, the Superior Court of California, Los
Angeles County finds itself in an equally unattractive position.
California’s common-law and statutory protection of ownership
rights in pre-1972 sound recordings is longstanding and does not
conflict with the federal scheme of copyright protection.157
Failure to enforce the rights claimed by the plaintiffs would
upset decades of settled state law. Conversely, by continuing to
enforce such ownership rights, the court may open a virtual
Pandora’s Box of consequences. Would Sirius XM alter its
broadcasting scheme to avoid making royalty payments? If so,
would the service suffer a substantial blow to its bottom line in
the form of reduced subscribership? If Sirius XM continued
broadcasting such recordings and paid royalties, would not the
cost of those royalties be passed along to its subscribers? If so,
would all subscribers have to pay, or only those who live in
157. See supra Part IV.
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California and other states with protections for owners of pre1972 sound recordings? How fair would it be for Sirius XM to
impose the costs associated with California’s state law and
public policy on subscribers in other states?
Fortunately, confrontation of the myriad issues that would
be left unsettled even after resolution of the lawsuits discussed
herein need not be left to the many state and federal courts.
These issues can be substantially resolved (avoided?) by
amending the federal Copyright Act to include protection for
sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972. As noted by
the Copyright Office, “[b]ringing pre-1972 sound recordings into
the federal copyright system completes the work Congress began
in 1976 when it brought most works protected by state common
law copyright into the federal statutory scheme.”158 Ironically,
the Copyright Office has expressed some confusion as to why
Congress did not include all such works under the federal
scheme in the first instance.159
In light of the potential for extensive future uncertainty if
the current federal copyright scheme for sound recordings
remains intact, the potential for such uncertainty to be avoided
by adopting the recommendations of the Copyright Office, and
Congress’ “articulated goal of a unitary system of copyright,”160
a further amendment of the Copyright Act to extend federal
protection to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972 is
warranted.

158. Federal Copyright Protection, supra note 154.
159. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE1972
SOUND
RECORDINGS
17
(2011),
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf (“It is apparent from
the legislative reports concerning the Sound Recording Amendment and the
1976 Copyright Act that Congress well understood it was leaving in place the
state law regime for pre-1972 sound recordings, rather than bringing them
under federal law.
However, nowhere does Congress explain the
considerations that, in its view, supported this result. This omission is
particularly curious in light of Congress’s articulated goal of a unitary system
of copyright and its decision to implement that goal by bringing essentially all
other works protected by state law copyright regimes into the federal system.”).
160. Id.
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